Hermann Hoth

Born on 14 April 1885 in Neuruppin,[2] Hoth grew up in Demmin.[3] His parents were Hermann Hoth, a Prussian staff officer surgeon, and Margarethe Hoth (née Hübener).[2] He attended the Cadet Corps at Potsdam in his youth,[4] and later attributed his love for the military as well as a heightened belief in authority to this education.[5] The educators at the Cadet Corps also instilled monarchism and the rejection of social democracy in Hoth.[6] He was commissioned as lieutenant the army in 1903, but his rise in the ranks was slow.[7] He attended the Prussian Staff College from 1910 to 1913,[8] where he learned Russian,[9] was appointed Oberleutnant in 1912 and Hauptmann in 1914.[7] At this point, he was working at the German General Staff.[10] His first son, Hans Joachim, was born in 1913.[2]

Hoth spent only four weeks at the front in World War I, serving the remaining time as a staff officer.[11] As a result of his skill in Russian, he was assigned to the 8th Army on the Eastern Front. The Russian invasion of East Prussia (1914) left a deep impact on Hoth, as he saw the Russians waging war with what he regarded as Asiatic brutality and savagery.[12] He was awarded both classes of the Iron Cross during the war.[13] In the German Revolution of 1918–1919, Hoth helped to put down left-wing uprisings at Halle.[14] This period hardened his hatred for any form of Communism.[15] On the other side, Hoth believed that the failure of the right-wing Kapp Putsch proved that the military had to prevent its misue in politics.[16] He also married Lola Schubering in 1918. Hoth's second son, Hermann, was born in 1923.[2]

He remained in the Reichswehr (the armed forces of the Weimar Republic) in the interwar period,[13] serving at the organization department of the General Staff.[17] In 1927, Hoth was sent to the Soviet Union as part of secret military cooperation missions.[18]

In the 1920s, Hoth had little interest in the Nazi Party, and even regarded its activities as disruptive for the Reichswehr. His views changed with the 1930 German federal election when the Nazi Party became the second-strongest political force. Hoth started to view Hitler's nationalist ambitions with approval, and admired the Nazis' attention to workers which he viewed as unusual for a right-wing party.[19] He was among the officers who were most favorable disposed toward Hitler's seizure of control, regarding it as a chance to improve the military.[20] In the aftermath of the takeover, however, Hoth (by then promoted to Oberst) clashed with Nazi Party officials when he criticised the murder of Communists and Social Democrats in Braunschweig, resulting in his transfer to Lübeck.[21]

According to his own account, Hoth studied the ideology of the Nazi Party in some depth over the next years; historian Johannes Hürter regarded this as quite unusual for higher-ranking German officers, most of whom believed that they could remain apolitical.[22] Hoth generally approved of the aims and achievements of the Nazi Party, although he expressed some disquiet about the elimination of German Jews. In the end, however, he believed that fate of Jews to be less important than the elimination of Communism in Germany and the rise of his country in international relations.[23] Following the reorganization of the German military into the Wehrmacht in 1935, he was appointed to command the 18th Infantry Division.[13] He was regarded as one of the most modern Wehrmacht officers at the time, advocating motorization and other modernization.[24] The Blomberg–Fritsch affair of 1938 cemented Hoth's total trust in Hitler as a leader.[25]

Hoth was promoted to Lieutenant-General and given command of the XV Motorised Corps in 1938, leading it in the invasion of Poland the following year.[13] Convinced of Hitler's capability as leader, Hoth believed the new war served a higher purpose and would decide the fate of the German people.[26] During the invasion of France in May 1940, his panzer corps was on Guderian's right flank during their advance through the Ardennes, and contained the 5th Panzer and 7th Panzer Divisions.[13] Hoth was able to encircle the French 1st Army under René Prioux at Lille during the campaign.[27] His successes in France made him one of the Wehrmacht's most popular generals.[28] He was promoted to Generaloberst in July 1940.[13]

Hoth (right) with Heinz Guderian, commander of Panzer Group 2, 21 June 1941

Hoth commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa in 1941.[29][30] In his diaries, Hoth expressed no doubts about or opposition to the invasion, mirroring the opinion of most high-ranking German commanders.[31] From a moral and ideological standpoint, Hoth believed that Russia had been overtaken by "Jewish Bolshevism", causing the country to turn away from its European heritage, transforming it into an expansionist, Asiatic, and despotic state as well as setting it on an unavoidable collision course with Germany. Hürter argued that Hoth's beliefs showcased remarkable similarities with Hitler's. Even after the war, Hoth continued to maintain that the invasion had been just based on these arguments.[32] On the other side, Hoth continued to voice misgivings about the invasion plan's strategic aspects. He tried to convince his superior, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, that the 3rd Panzer Group had to operate with greater flexibility and prepare to strike deeper into the Soviet Union than intended by the high command (OKH). Bock rebuffed these requests.[33] Regardless of his misgivings, Hoth generally adhered to the decided-upon plans and Bock's commands during the invasion. Researcher Robert Kirchubel described him as a "team player" and reliable in crisises during Operation Barbarossa.[1]

In course of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group broke through the Soviet border defenses with relative ease. Beck consequently released Hoth from the 9th Army, allowing him to operate more freely.[34] The 3rd Panzer Group proceeeded to encircle and capture Minsk and Vitebsk as part of Army Group Center's operations.[29][35] At this point, Hoth again argued that the 3rd Panzer Group should move deeper into the Soviet territory and encircle more enemy troops before closing the pocket. This time he was supported by Bock, but they were overruled by the OKH.[36] Alongside Guderian's forces, Hoth then pushed further to attack Smolensk, believing that they had to continue their advance to not allow the Red Army to reorganize.[37] In this battle, Hoth broke through the Daugava-Dnieper line, allowing for the encirclement of three Soviet armies.[38] As the Wehrmacht advanced, questions arose about the treatment of suspected Red Army soldiers or deserters in civilian clothing. Hoth ordered the 3rd Panzer Group's officers to subject such individuals to a limited examination; if the officers concluded that the prisoners were Red Army soldiers, they were to be shot.[39] Like all German armies on the Eastern Front, Hoth's Panzer Group also implemented the Commissar Order.[40] Following the war, Hoth was the only German general who admitted that he had agreed with the order, believing that the Soviet political commissars could not be regarded as regular soldiers.[41] According to reports from subordinate units, the order was carried out on a widespread basis.[42]

In mid-July 1941, the 3rd Panzer Group was subordinated to Army Group North to shore up the flanks and attempted to seize Velikie Luki.[29] Hoth's forces were driven back on 20 July when Red Army forces broke through the German lines, prompting criticism from Bock for unnecessarily striking out too far to the north east.[43] In mid to late August, Hoth's forces faced another setback owing to heavy losses and dispersal of efforts: facing the heavily reinforced Soviet 19th Army, he committed the 7th Panzer Division without infantry support, which resulted in what the historian David Stahel describes as a "debacle". The division's attack ran into fortified Soviet lines and was repulsed with the loss of 30 tanks.[44]

Execution of Soviet partisans by German forces.

In October Hoth was appointed commander of the 17th Army in Ukraine.[45] By this point, he was arguing for a pause of offensive operations due to logistical issues and the exhaustion of his troops.[46] Hoth was an active supporter of the war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg) against the Soviet Union, calling on his men to understand the need for "harsh punishment of Jewry". Under Hoth's command, units of the 17th Army took part in the hunt for and murder of Jews in its territory of control.[47][48] Following the issuance of the Severity Order by Walter von Reichenau in October 1941, he issued the following directive to troops under his command in November 1941:[49]

Every sign of active or passive resistance or any sort of machinations on the part of Jewish-Bolshevik agitators are to be immediately and pitilessly exterminated ... These circles are the intellectual supports of Bolshevism, the bearers of its murderous organisation, the helpmates of the partisans. It is the same Jewish class of beings who have done so much damage to our own Fatherland by virtue of their activities against the nation and civilisation, and who promote anti-German tendencies throughout the world, and who will be the harbingers of revenge. Their extermination is a dictate of our own survival.

Hürter argued that this order reflected that Hoth was fully aware of the ongoing Holocaust, and evidently urged his troops to kill Jews not just due to their alleged support for anti-German elements, but also to prevent them from taking revenge in the future.[50] Based on this reasoning and claiming that the Red Army was also operating with extreme brutality, Hoth additionally ordered the 17th Army's soldiers to kill all suspected partisans. He adviced subordinate officers to cultivate the growing hatred for Soviet troops among the common German soldiers.[51] Hoth also ordered the shooting of any civilians encountered in the woods, as these could potentially support or be partisans.[52] He also agreed with and ordered the mass requisitioning of food, despite causing starvation in occupied cities.[53] In his diaries, Hoth expressed his belief that leniency was the main reason for resistance in the rear areas; accordingly the German security forces should exterminate any opposition without mercy.[52] At the same time, Hoth moderated some of the most extreme orders from the OKH; for instance, he ordered his troops to not treat the Ukraine as a colony, and to show local civilians some respect. Hoth believed that the Ukrainians would become part of the new order in Europe.[54]

Hoth (left) with Friedrich Paulus during the Battle of Stalingrad, November 1942

During the Soviet winter offensives of early 1942, Hoth's 17th Army was driven back in the Second Battle of Kharkov.[55] His requests to orderly retreat during this battle were denied by Bock.[56] In June 1942, he took over from General Richard Ruoff as commander of 4th Panzer Army.[13] As part of Operation Blue, the German offensive in southern Russia, the army reached the Don River at Voronezh. Hoth was then ordered to drive to Rostov-on-Don. It then advanced to the north in support of the Sixth Army's attempt to capture Stalingrad.[55]

In November 1942, the Soviet Operation Uranus broke through the Axis lines and trapped the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. Hoth's panzer army led the unsuccessful attempt to relieve the Sixth Army (Operation Winter Storm), under the overall command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group Don. By 25 December, the operation had failed.[13] Hoth's forces suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat 600 kilometres (370 mi) into the eastern Ukraine.[57]

In February 1943, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army participated in the counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the Donbass region.[58] The operation was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as Third Battle of Kharkov, it commenced on 21 February, as the 4th Panzer Army launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north,[59] retaking Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March.[60] Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March.[61] The counteroffensive left a salient extending into the German area of control, centered around the city of Kursk, and leading up to Operation Citadel.[61]

German soldiers at their defensive positions during the Battle of the Dnieper

In July 1943, Hoth commanded the 4th Panzer Army in the Battle of Kursk as part of Army Group South. Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment, directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient. The Army Group South committed Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, alongside Army Detachment Kempf.[62] At this point, Hoth was considered one of the Wehrmacht's most experienced senior-level tank commanders, but he had dimished in regards to his leadership compared to the early war. Historian Robert Forczyk argued that Hoth showed signs of "approaching burnout". As the offensive at Kursk was repeatedly delayed, Hoth became increasingly pessimistic about Operation Citadel's chances of success due to the increasing Soviet defenses.[57] Despite this, both Hoth as well as Werner Kempf, commander of the eponymous army detachment, decided not to prepare for obstacle breaching at Kursk, assuming that the German engineers would remove Soviet minefields without much difficulty. They also did not realize the depth and strength of Nikolai Vatutin' defense lines.[63] As a result of German mistakes in planning, coordination between Hoth and Kempf would be poor during the offensive, with each fighting a separate battle.[64]

When Operation Citadel started, Hoth's divisions, reinforced by the II SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser, penetrated several Soviet defensive lines, before being brought to a halt in the Battle of Prokhorovka.[65] This was partially the result of Hoth hesitating to keep advancing as his flanks were threatened by Soviet counter-attacks, while Kempf's force had been unable to keep up.[66] On the other side, Forczyk argued that Hoth "rightly" chose to ignore orders by Manstein to reinforce failing attacks by Hermann Breith.[67] Overall, the Battle of Kursk was a major Soviet victory.[68]

In the aftermath of Kursk, the Red Army mounted a series of successful offensives that crossed the Dnieper.[13] Hoth was unable to destroy the Soviet bridgeheads across the river.[69] In September 1943, Hoth's army was operationally penetrated by Red Army units and was unable to maintain a continuous front line even in retreat. The army crossed the Dnieper south and north of Kiev with heavy losses.[13] In November, the Red Army broke through Hoth's defenses in a surprise offesive which retook Kiev[70] and ultimately pushed the Germans out of eastern Ukraine.[13] The rapid loss of Kiev "humiliated" Hoth[71] who was blamed by Hitler for this defeat.[72] On 10 December 1943, Hoth was relieved of command, and was not recalled until April 1945.[13] Forczyk argued that the German failures in the battle of the Dnieper had resulted from both Hitler's interferences in tactical matters as well as the inability of the Wehrmacht commanders, including Hoth, to anticipate Soviet actions. According to him, they had not recognized the rapid improvement of the Red Army.[73]