Battle of Seneffe

Both France and the Dutch Republic viewed the Spanish Netherlands as essential for their security and trade, making it a contested area throughout the 17th century. France had occupied much of the region in the 1667-68 War of Devolution, before being forced by the Dutch-led Triple Alliance to return most of their gains in the 1668 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.[9] After this, Louis XIV decided the best way to force concessions from the Dutch was by defeating them first.[10]

When the Franco-Dutch War began in May 1672, French troops quickly overran large parts of the Netherlands, but by July the Dutch position had stabilised. The unexpected success of his offensive had encouraged Louis to make excessive demands, while concern at French gains brought the Dutch support from Brandenburg-Prussia, Emperor Leopold, and Charles II of Spain. In August 1673, an Imperial army entered the Rhineland; facing war on multiple fronts, Louis withdrew most of his forces from the Netherlands, retaining only Grave and Maastricht.[11]

In January 1674, Denmark joined the anti-French coalition, followed by the February Treaty of Westminster, which ended the Third Anglo-Dutch War.[12] In May, the French took the offensive in the Spanish territory of Franche-Comté, while Condé remained on the defensive in the Spanish Netherlands. A combined Dutch-Spanish force under William of Orange and Count Monterrey, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, spent June and July attempting to bring Condé to battle. When this proved unsuccessful, William proposed invading French Flanders, which would threaten Condé's rear and force him to fight; Monterrey agreed since it also provided an opportunity to recapture the key Spanish border town of Charleroi.[13]

On 23 July, William was joined near Nivelles by an Imperial force under de Souches, a French Huguenot exile; along with 5,000 Spanish infantry and cavalry, this brought his numbers up to about 65,000. At the same time, the French completed their occupation of Franche-Comté which allowed Louis to send Condé substantial reinforcements, including his son the duc d'Enghien. By early August, Condé had 45,000 men entrenched along the line of the Piéton river which joined the Sambre at Charleroi.[14]

Mons

Maastricht

Seneffe

Nivelles

Liège

Brussels

Charleroi

Grave

The Seneffe campaign, 1674; key locations in the Low Countries

Concluding these positions were too strong for a frontal assault, on 9 August the Allied army moved out of Nivelles and established a line running from the villages of Arquennes to Roux, on the French left. By doing so, they hoped to tempt Condé into an attack but he simply shifted his troops to face the threat; as a result, William proposed moving around Seneffe, and into the French rear.[14] This was supported by the Spanish, since it would cut Condé's supply lines and isolate the French garrison in Charleroi (see Map).[15]

At 4:00 am on 11 August, the Allies set out in three columns, each marching parallel to the French positions, a formation dictated by the poor roads. The left column was commanded by de Souches, the right by the Marqués de Assentar, commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders, with the bulk of the infantry and artillery in the centre under William. A vanguard of 2,000 cavalry covered the gaps between the columns, with another 5,200 bringing up the rear led by Prince Vaudémont.[16]

Hearing the Allies were on the move, at 5:30 am Condé rode out to observe their dispositions, and quickly perceived their intentions. The terrain they were crossing was marshy and broken up by numerous hedges, walls and woods, with limited exit points; gambling these factors would negate their superior numbers, Condé decided to attack. He sent 400 light cavalry under Saint Clar to skirmish with the Allied rearguard and slow down their march, while also despatching a cavalry brigade under the Marquis de Rannes to seize the high ground north of Seneffe.[17]

Around 10:00 am, de Rannes came into contact with Vaudémont, who asked William for infantry support; he was sent three battalions, which he placed near the bridge over the Zenne or Senne river that flowed through Seneffe, with his cavalry just behind.[16] Despite gout so severe he was unable to wear riding boots, Condé himself led the elite Maison du Roi cavalry across the Zenne above Seneffe, and scattered Vaudémont's cavalry, whose headlong flight temporarily disrupted the Spanish troops immediately behind them.[2] Simultaneous assaults by de Rannes and the duc de Luxembourg overwhelmed the Allied infantry in Seneffe, who were either killed or taken prisoner.[18] By midday, Condé had inflicted significant losses on the Allies and gained a clear, if minor victory but he then launched a series of frontal assaults against the advice of his subordinates, and the battle became a series of confused and costly firefights.[13]

The duc d'Enghien rescues his father Condé at Seneffe

William halted his march and the Dutch infantry established a defensive line centred on the nearby Priory of St Nicolas; on their left, Assentar had rallied his troops, which he placed behind fortified positions in the hamlet of Fayt-la-Manage. Condé led one charge in person, during which he was unhorsed and had to be rescued by his son, the Duc d'Enghien. Although the French cavalry once again succeeded in driving the Allied horse from the field, they themselves were exhausted, while the opposing infantry remained intact and held their ground.[19]

However, de Souches had been given secret instructions from Vienna to minimise casualties and late in the afternoon ordered the Imperial troops to withdraw, which allowed Luxembourg to capture much of the Allied baggage train.[20] Despite heavy losses, French infantry finally forced the Allies out of St Nicolas in the early evening, bringing an end to the fighting.[4] Among the dead were Sir Walter Vane, deputy commander of the elite Scots Brigade,[21] and Assentar, whose body was later returned by Condé for burial; the two armies remained where they were until just after midnight, when the French resumed their original positions along the Piéton and William withdrew to Mons.[13]

Although both sides claimed victory on the basis of "holding their ground" at the end of the fighting, neither gained a clear advantage, although some historians argue the battle was a narrow French tactical victory.[3] The result could have been far more decisive had Condé taken advantage of his initial success,[22] but his mistakes, combined with the courage and discipline of the Dutch and Spanish infantry, rescued William from a serious defeat.[23] Despite capturing over 100 colours and standards, as well as most of the Allied baggage train, Condé failed to inflict a crushing defeat on the Allies.[24] Since William quickly replaced his losses, while Condé was ordered to remain on the defensive for the next two years, other historians suggest the result was essentially inconclusive.[25] [26] [27] [2]

Casualties on both sides were enormous, estimates of French losses ranging from 7,000 [4] to 10,000 dead or wounded, [5][6] and those of the Allies from 10,000 [4] to 15,000, including prisoners.[5][6][3][lower-alpha 2]The number shocked the French court, one contemporary writing "We have lost so much by this victory that without the Te Deum and captured flags at Notre Dame, we would believe we had lost the battle".[30] French military engineer and strategist Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban responded to news of Seneffe by arguing the best way to achieve victory was not to fight any more battles and Louis ordered Condé to avoid a repeat.[8]

Condé's formal reception by Louis XIV at Versailles following Seneffe

The Imperial troops escaped relatively untouched from the carnage at Seneffe, William claiming they had deliberately ignored requests for support. Although Allied casualties were higher than those of the French, they were quickly replaced by taking troops from garrisons.[8] In addition, a large convoy arrived in the Allied camp outside Mons on 31 August, bringing supplies, a month's pay in advance for the survivors and five new Dutch regiments. Combined with the losses suffered by Condé, the Allied army was now stronger relative to the French than before Seneffe, and William proposed another invasion attempt.[24]

However, one less appreciated advantage held by the French over their opponents in this period was the benefit of undivided command and unified strategy. For different reasons, neither Monterrey or de Souches were willing to risk another battle and William was forced to compromise by besieging Oudenarde. Operations commenced on 16 September, and Condé began marching to its relief three days later. The Dutch and Spanish redoubled efforts to breach the walls before his arrival, but without advising his colleagues, de Souches sent the Imperial artillery off to Ghent. On 20 September, Condé took up position on the left bank of the Scheldt river and began bombarding the Allied positions on 21st.[31] Since de Souches's troops would not fight without their guns, and the Dutch and Spanish could not face the French on their own, the Allies were forced to abandon the siege.[32] Leaving behind most of their remaining equipment, the Allied troops were closely followed and harassed by the French cavalry.[31]

After strong protests from the Dutch States General, de Souches was relieved of his command, but this did little to solve the reality of diverging objectives. Emperor Leopold preferred to focus Imperial resources on the Upper Rhine, the Spanish wanted to recoup their losses in the Spanish Netherlands, while the Dutch prioritised the recapture of Grave and Maastricht.[33] The Spanish returned to their garrisons, the Imperial troops recrossed the Meuse, [31] while William assumed command of operations at Grave, which had been besieged since 28 June and surrendered on 29 October.[32] Condé received an elaborate state reception at Versailles for Seneffe, but his health was failing and the casualties diminished Louis' trust in his abilities. He temporarily assumed command of French troops in the Rhineland following Turenne's death at Salzbach in July 1675, but retired before the end of the year. In the longer term, Seneffe confirmed Louis' preference for positional warfare, ushering in a period where siege and manoeuvre dominated military tactics.[34]

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