Audience cost

In international relations theory, an audience cost is the domestic political cost that a leader incurs from his or her constituency if they escalate a foreign policy crisis and are then seen as backing down.[1][2][3] It is considered to be one of the potential mechanisms for democratic peace theory. It is associated with rational choice scholarship in international relations.

The implication of audience costs is that threats issued by leaders (who incur audience costs) against other states are more likely to be seen as credible and thus lead those states to meet the demands of the leader making threats.[4][5]

Democratic peace theory
Main article: Democratic peace theory

The term was popularized in a 1994 academic article by James Fearon where he argued that democracies carry greater audience costs than authoritarian states, which makes them better at signaling their intentions in interstate disputes.[6][7][8] It is one of the mechanisms for democratic peace theory.

Fearon's argument regarding the credibility of democratic states in disputes has been subject to debate among international relations scholars. Two studies 2001, using the MID and ICB datasets, provided empirical support for the notion that democracies were more likely to issue effective threats.[9][10] There is survey experiment data that substantiates that specified threats induce audience costs,[11][12][13] but also data with mixed findings,[14] and nuanced findings.[15] A 2019 study found that audiences across the partisan divide did punish Trump, Obama, and "The President" for backing down after issuing threats, but it also found that presidents could reduce the audience costs by justifying the backing down as being in the national interest of the United States.[16] Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu argue that the nature of audience costs (they are a mechanism, not an effect) makes them hard to detect empirically.[17] Kenneth Schultz has also remarked on the methodological difficulties in empirically assessing audience costs.[18] A major problem in assessing audience costs is the fact that leaders typically make threats that are ambiguous in terms of time, place, specific action that trigger the threat, and nature of response.[19] A smoking gun case for audience costs would be a case where the public opposes military action but subsequently punishes a leader for not going through with a threat to engage in military action.[19]

Branislav Slantchev, Matthew Baum and Philip Potter have argued that the presence of a free media is a key component of audience costs.[20][21] According to Matthew S. Levendusky, and Michael C. Horowitz, leaders can provide justifications to their audiences for why they backed down from a threat, thus reducing the audience costs.[22]

Roseanne McManus finds support for the existence of audience costs but argues that the credibility of a threat necessarily also relies on the threatener's military strength, hawkishness of domestic veto players, and leaders’ security in office.[23]

Criticisms

However, a 2012 study by Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser found that existing datasets were not suitable to draw any conclusions as to whether democratic states issued more effective threats.[4] They constructed their own dataset specifically for interstate military threats and outcomes, which found no relationship between regime type and effective threats.[4] A 2017 study which recoded flaws in the MID dataset ultimately conclude, " that there are no regime-based differences in dispute reciprocation, and prior findings may be based largely on poorly coded data."[24] Other scholars have disputed the democratic credibility argument, questioning its causal logic and empirical validity.[19] Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard argue that there is no evidence of audience costs in any post-1945 crises, leaders rarely make unambiguous threats, publics care about policy substance (not leader consistency in rhetoric and action), and publics care about the country's honor (not whether the leader issued an explicit threat).[19] They add that in cases where audience costs have been observed, it is frequently when the public is hawkish and pushes leaders to adopt hardline stances and actions; it is unclear whether the domestic costs in those cases is because leaders fear getting caught bluffing or whether they just do not want to defy a hawkish public.[19]

A 2021 study found that Americans perceived democracies to be more likely to back down in crises, which contradicts the expectations of the audience costs literature.[25] A 2011 study argued that domestic audiences in democratic states were less capable of punishing leaders for backing down because democratic leaders have larger "winning coalitions."[26] A 2012 study by Marc Trachtenberg, which analyzed a dozen great power crises, found no evidence of the presence of audience costs in these crises.[27]

A 2005 study, which used a formal bargaining model, found that in situations when both sides issue public threats, a "prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands."[28]

According to a 2021 study by Jayme R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy, leaders may be unaware of audience costs. To the extent that audience costs work, it may be a learned practice rather than a consistent and timeless feature of international politics.[5]

Research by Jessica Weeks argued that some authoritarian regime types have similar audience costs as in democratic states.[29][30] Research by Jessica Chen Weiss argued that the Chinese regime fomented or clamped down on nationalist (or anti-foreign) protests in China in order to signal resolve. Fomenting or permitting nationalist protests entail audience costs, as they make it harder for the Chinese regime to back down in a foreign policy crisis out of fear that the protestors turn against the regime.[31]

Secret negotiations

Some scholars have grappled with the relationship between secret negotiations and audience costs. Shuhei Kurizaki,[32] Austin Carson,[33] Keren Yarhi-Milo,[34] and Levenotoglu and Tarar[28] have argued that secret operations, threats and agreements can reduce inadvertent escalation to war by insulating leaders from a domestic backlash if the diplomacy had been conducted in public. Austin Carson argues that covert operations allow states to pursue their foreign policy interests without risking escalation to war. By keeping the operation covert, the state avoids pressure by domestic audiences to escalate the operation beyond its original intent, and communicates to the adversary an intent to keep the operation limited.[33] Keren Yarhi-Milo argues that secret agreements between adversaries can lead to lasting peace if the initiator of the secret agreement faces domestic opposition to the terms of the agreement; the ability of the other state to publicly disclose these terms means that they are a form of costly signaling of intentions by the initiator.[34]

Audience costs in other contexts

States may be more likely to honor alliance commitments due to audience costs.[35]

According to a 2020 study by Joshua A. Schwartz and Christopher W. Blair, gender stereotypes about leaders lead to audience costs, as women leaders are punished more severely for backing down after issuing threats.[36]

A 2006 study by Todd Allee and Paul Huth found that leaders try to avoid audience costs for voluntary negotiated settlements by instead using rulings by an international court or arbitration body, which the leaders can blame for adverse outcomes.[37]

References
  1. "Audience Costs and the Credibility of Commitments", International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2021, doi:10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0305, ISBN 978-0-19-974329-2
  2. James Fearon (7 September 2013). "'Credibility' is not everything but it's not nothing either". The Monkey Cage. Retrieved 8 January 2014. I'm drawing here on arguments about what the IR literature usually calls 'audience costs,' which are domestic political costs a leader may pay for escalating an international dispute, or for making implicit or explicit threats, and then backing down or not following through.
  3. Trager, Robert F. (2016). "The Diplomacy of War and Peace". Annual Review of Political Science. 19 (1): 205–228. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051214-100534. ISSN 1094-2939.
  4. Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 23279964. S2CID 154325372.
  5. Schlesinger, Jayme R.; Levy, Jack S. (2021). "Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis". European Journal of International Security. 6 (3): 338–357. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.7. ISSN 2057-5637.
  6. Fearon, James D. (September 1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute". American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. JSTOR 2944796.
  7. Schultz, Kenneth A. (2012). "Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now". Security Studies. 21 (3): 369–375. doi:10.1080/09636412.2012.706475. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 153373634.
  8. Tomz, Michael (2007). "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach". International Organization. 61 (4): 821–40. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.386.7495. doi:10.1017/S0020818307070282. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 154895678. The seminal article is Fearon 1994.
  9. Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.
  10. Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 146346368.
  11. Trager, Robert F.; Vavreck, Lynn (2011). "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party". American Journal of Political Science. 55 (3): 526–545. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x. ISSN 1540-5907.
  12. Levy, Jack S.; McKoy, Michael K.; Poast, Paul; Wallace, Geoffrey P. R. (2015). "Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory". American Journal of Political Science. 59 (4): 988–1001. doi:10.1111/ajps.12197. ISSN 1540-5907.
  13. Tomz, Michael (2007). "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach". International Organization. 61 (4): 821–840. doi:10.1017/S0020818307070282. ISSN 1531-5088. S2CID 154895678.
  14. Kertzer, Joshua D.; Brutger, Ryan (2016). "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory". American Journal of Political Science. 60 (1): 234–249. doi:10.1111/ajps.12201. ISSN 1540-5907.
  15. Brutger, Ryan; Kertzer, Joshua D. (2018). "A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs". International Organization. 72 (3): 693–724. doi:10.1017/S0020818318000188. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 149511346.
  16. Evers, Miles M.; Fisher, Aleksandr; Schaaf, Steven D. (2019). "Is There a Trump Effect? An Experiment on Political Polarization and Audience Costs". Perspectives on Politics. 17 (2): 433–452. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003390. ISSN 1537-5927. S2CID 181670458.
  17. Gartzke, Erik; Lupu, Yonatan (2012). "Still Looking for Audience Costs". Security Studies. 21 (3): 391–397. doi:10.1080/09636412.2012.706486. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 219715939.
  18. Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). "Looking for Audience Costs". The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 45 (1): 32–60. doi:10.1177/0022002701045001002. ISSN 0022-0027. JSTOR 3176282. S2CID 146554967.
  19. Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". American Political Science Review. 105 (3): 437–456. doi:10.1017/s000305541100027x. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 144584619.
  20. Slantchev, Branislav L. (2006). "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs". International Studies Quarterly. 50 (2): 445–477. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00409.x. ISSN 0020-8833. JSTOR 3693618.
  21. Potter, Philip B. K.; Baum, Matthew A. (2014). "Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Democratic Constraint". The Journal of Politics. 76 (1): 167–181. doi:10.1017/S0022381613001230. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 39535209.
  22. Levendusky, Matthew S.; Horowitz, Michael C. (2012). "When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs". The Journal of Politics. 74 (2): 323–338. doi:10.1017/S002238161100154X. ISSN 0022-3816.
  23. McManus, Roseanne W. (2017). Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316756263. ISBN 978-1-107-17034-6.
  24. Gibler, Douglas M.; Miller, Steven V.; Little, Erin K. (2016-12-01). "An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816–2001". International Studies Quarterly. 60 (4): 719–730. doi:10.1093/isq/sqw045. ISSN 0020-8833. S2CID 151567567.
  25. Kertzer, Joshua D.; Renshon, Jonathan; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2021). "How Do Observers Assess Resolve?". British Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 308–330. doi:10.1017/S0007123418000595. ISSN 0007-1234. S2CID 197463343.
  26. Brown, Jonathan N.; Marcum, Anthony S. (2011). "Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy". Security Studies. 20 (2): 141–170. doi:10.1080/09636412.2011.572671. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 144555729.
  27. Trachtenberg, Marc (2012). "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis". Security Studies. 21 (1): 3–42. doi:10.1080/09636412.2012.650590. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 145647675.
  28. Levenotoğlu, Bahar; Tarar, Ahmer (2005). "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining". American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 419–433. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051750. hdl:10161/2534. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 16072285.
  29. Weeks, Jessica L. (2008). "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve". International Organization. 62 (1): 35–64. doi:10.1017/S0020818308080028. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 40071874. S2CID 154432066.
  30. Weeks, Jessica L. P. (2014). Dictators at War and Peace. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5296-3. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt1287f18.
  31. Weiss, Jessica Chen (2014). Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-938757-1.
  32. Kurizaki, Shuhei (2007). "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy". American Political Science Review. 101 (3): 543–558. doi:10.1017/S0003055407070396. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 154793333.
  33. Carson, Austin (2018). Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-18176-9.
  34. Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2013). "Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance". Security Studies. 22 (3): 405–435. doi:10.1080/09636412.2013.816126. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 153936013.
  35. Morrow, James D. (2000). "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?". Annual Review of Political Science. 3 (1): 63–83. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63. ISSN 1094-2939.
  36. Schwartz, Joshua A.; Blair, Christopher W. (2020). "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining". International Organization. 74 (4): 872–895. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000223. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 225735033.
  37. Allee, Todd L.; Huth, Paul K. (2006). "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover". American Political Science Review. 100 (2): 219–234. doi:10.1017/S0003055406062125. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 145146053.
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