1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran

The 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran[2] erupted in mid-March 1979,[2] some two months after the completion of the Iranian Revolution. It subsequently became the largest among the nationwide uprisings in Iran against the new state and one of the most intense Kurdish rebellions in modern Iran. Initially, Kurdish movements were trying to align with the new government of Iran, seeking to emphasize their Muslim identity and seek common ground with other Iranians. The KDPI even briefly branded itself as a non-separatist organization, allegedly criticizing those calling for independence, but nevertheless calling for political autonomy.[11] However, following a number of attacks on Iranian army barracks in Kurdistan province by militant groups, relations between some Kurdish organizations and the Iranian government quickly deteriorated, and although Shi'a Kurds and some Sunni tribal leaders turned towards the new Shi'a Islamic State, Sunni Kurdish leftists and communists continued the nationalist project in their enclave in Kurdistan Province.[1]

1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran
Part of Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution and Kurdish separatism in Iran[1]

The epicenter of insurrection
DateMarch 1979–1981[2]/1983[3]
Location
Result

Iranian victory

  • Most of Iranian force diverted to the Iran–Iraq War front since late 1980
  • Pockets of PDKI resistance remain until 1983[3]
Belligerents

Interim Government and Council of the Islamic Revolution (1979−80)


Islamic Republic of Iran (1980−83)

KDP-I
Komala
IPFG[4]
OIPFG (Minority)[5]


Supported by:

Iraq[6]
Commanders and leaders

Ruhollah Khomeini
Mehdi Bazargan
Abulhassan Banisadr
Mohammad-Ali Rajai
Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani
Ali Khamenei
Mir-Hossein Mousavi

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
Foad Mostafa Soltani 
Abdullah Mohtadi
Sedigh Kamangar
Jafar Shafiyi

Ashraf Dehghani[4]
Units involved

IRI Army

Revolutionary Guards
Unknown
Strength
Unknown 7,000 (according to the KDPI)[2]
A few captured tanks and light artillery pieces, recoilness guns and machine guns[8]
Casualties and losses
3,000+ killed (Iranian Government claim)[2] 5,000 killed (Iranian Government claim)[2]

1,200 Kurdish political prisoners executed[2]
12 Iranian officers executed for refusing to fight[2]

Total: 3,000[9]–10,000 killed[10]

While at first, Kurdish militants, primarily of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, made some territorial gains in the area of Mahabad and temporarily ousted Iranian troops from the region, a large scale offensive in spring 1980 by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard reversed the course of the conflict.

Following the eruption of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980, an even greater effort was made by the Iranian government to crush the Kurdish rebellion, which was the last of the 1979 uprisings to still go on. By 1981, the Iranian regular forces and the Revolutionary Guard ousted the Kurdish militants from their strongholds, but small groups of Kurdish militants continued to execute sporadic attacks against Iranian militias. Clashes in the area went on as late as 1983.

About 10,000 people were killed in the course of the Kurdish rebellion, with 1,200 of them being Kurdish political prisoners, executed in the last phases of the rebellion, mostly by the Iranian government.[2] The conflict later resurged once again in 1989, following the assassination of KDPI leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, allegedly by Iranian agents.

Background

With traumatic experience during the Pahlavi rule in Iran and two major failed rebellions in 1946 and 1967, Kurdish political organizations were enthusiastic supporters of the revolution against the Shah, which brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power in February 1979. The Shah had shown himself to be no friend of Kurdish aspirations for greater autonomy nor a loosening of Tehran's control over their affairs. Once again, from the early days of the Islamic revolution, relations between the central government and Kurdish organizations were fraught with difficulties, and armed insurrection would ensue.

The Kurds, with their cross-border alliances, were seen as vulnerable to exploitation by foreign powers who wished to destabilize the young republic. Tensions between Iran and Iraq had previously seen both sides back opposing Kurdish rebels in the country of the other. Additionally, a large number of Iraqi Kurds migrated to Iranian Kurdistan following Saddam's suppression of Kurdish revolts there, many of whom were armed and continued engaging in militancy.[12] Many Iranian Sunni Kurds, unlike the overwhelming majority of their countrymen, abstained from voting to endorse the creation of an Islamic republic in March 1979. That referendum resulted in a 99.20% approval of the Islamic Republic in Kurdistan province, as compared to 99.31% nationwide.[13]

The crisis deepened after the KDPI's Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was denied a seat in the assembly of experts gathering in 1979, which was responsible for writing the new constitution. Ghassemlou had won his seat to the council with 34.9% of the vote, but was rejected after refusing the government's request for his group to disarm and return their weapons to government forces.[14][15]

The rebellion

Eruption

As the wave of nationalism engulfed eastern Kurdistan after the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty in line with a series of anti-revolutionary revolts across the country (in Khuzestan, Iranian Balochistan, and other parts of Iran), a full-scale rebellion was imminent. Also, in March 1979, the KDP-I formulated and publicly announced an eight-point plan for Kurdish independence.[6] This led to opposition from some other Kurdish leaders, such as Ahmad Moftizadeh, who announced their aversion to militarism and separatism.[12]

The uprising began in mid-March 1979 when Kurdish factions took over control of police headquarters, army bases, and parts of army barracks in Sanandaj.[2] The militants demanded the surrender of the army barracks in Sanandaj, resulting in the killing of 21 soldiers.[16] According to the BBC, the revolt began when Kurdish tribesmen overpowered Iranian militias in the town of Paveh.[17] Allegedly, unrest then spread to other Kurdish-dominated regions as the Kurds took over towns and army garrisons trying to keep out the Iranian army,[2] namely to the towns of Divan Darreh, Saqqez and Mahabad.[17] Many Kurdish leaders went into hiding after Khomeini ordered their arrest and execution.[17] Iranian newspaper reports at this stage put the number killed at about 600.[17] Two committees formed in Sanandaj at this time as well, one led by Moftizadeh and another by the head of the city's Hosseiniyah, named Safdari.[16] The Iranian government tried to resolve the conflict peacefully at this point, sending a delegation to Sanandaj and negotiating with all militant groups present there. The negotiations resulted in an agreement to halt hostilities. Following this, Brayim Younisi was temporarily appointed as the governor of Kurdistan province by the interior ministry. Various Kurdish groups rejected his appointment, causing the agreement to fall apart.[16]

In April 1979, armed conflict broke once again out between Kurdish factions and the Iranian revolutionary government's security forces. The Kurdish forces included primarily the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) and the leftist Komala (Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers).[18] By late April, fighting also broke out between Kurdish militants and government-aligned Azerbaijani factions in the area, resulting in the death of hundreds of Azeris and Kurds. One of the primary Azeri tribes involved in the fighting was the Qarapapaq tribe.[2]

Fighting campaigns and politics

In mid-August, without sufficient preparations and regardless of the army's advice, the Revolutionary Guard marched on the town of Paveh, falling into a major ambush, and resulting in the encirclement of a portion of the Iranian forces there.[2][19] The situation prompted Khomeini to approach the heads of the army and the government. As a result, Khomeini, in his statement on August 17, 1979, declared a jihad against Kurdish separatists, and key Kurdish nationalist figures were declared "enemies of the state", like Ghassemlou.[6] The government then began a three-week campaign to clear out rebel strongholds, mainly Saqqez and Mahabad. A week after it partially fell, the city of Paveh was fully recaptured by IRGC forces following a Kurdish withdrawal, marking the beginning of the Iranian counteroffensive.[19]

By August 20, 1979, the Iranian army had begun besieging Mahabad. By August 30 it was reported they had managed to completely surround the city and three days of negotiations started. After this failed, Iranian forces attacked the city on September 3[20] backed by F-4 fighter jets, artillery, and over 100 tanks.[21] They managed to seize control of the town after just several hours of fighting. The defeat in Mahabad was a major blow to the Iranian Kurdish factions, and afterwards Iranian forces continued their offensive, marching on the smaller town of Baneh.[20] Over 500 people were killed during the siege.[21]

The defenders were overwhelmed by the power of the Iranian offensive, using heavy artillery, tanks, and air cover, but managed some effective resistance. Despite the heavy casualties, the bulk of Kurdish Peshmerga evaded capture and death, and retreated into the mountains.[2] Iranian forces managed to retake the cities of Marivan, Bastam, Baneh, Sardasht, Mahabad, Bukan and Saqqez by the end of the operation. The Kurds resumed their offensive six weeks later, returning to Mahabad and combating the armored forces of Iran with Molotov cocktails and RPGs.[2] At the end of November, Kurds also attacked Sanandaj, Saqqez, and other Kurdish cities and towns.[2] The Kurdish offensive continued, as the Iranian government was distracted by other events in the country, such as the American Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran.

In a speech on 17 December 1979, Khomeini called the concept of ethnic minorities contrary to Islamic doctrines. He also accused those who do not wish Muslim countries to be united of creating the issue of nationalism among minorities. His views were shared by many in the clerical leadership.[22]

In late January 1980, After the new Iranian administration of President Banisadr took office, Revolutionary Guard units and government-aligned Kurds unsuccessfully battled rebels in the region, resulting in a stalemate that lasted until spring. By May 1980, Kurds still controlled much of the regions' roads, rural areas and held once again the city of Mahabad as their capital. The KDPI claimed to have over 7,000 fighters at the time.

Spring 1980 Iranian offensive

In the spring of 1980, government forces under the command of President Abolhassan Banisadr once again retook most of the Kurdish cities through a huge military campaign, sending in mechanized military divisions to Kurdish cities including Sanandaj, Pawe, and Marivan.[23] Neighbourhoods of some villages and towns were destroyed as a result of the fighting between Kurdish rebels and Government forces .[24] Ayatollah Khalkhali sentenced thousands of men to execution after summary trials. The Kurds however continued to hold Mahabad as the summer fighting diminished, while Iranian-Iraqi tensions grew, amid Iraqi attacks on Qasr-e Shirin and Sarpol-e Zahab which led to Iran moving its army to the border.[2][25][26]

Autumn 1980 Iranian operations

Kurdish force continued to hold Mahabad for five more months, as the Province of Kurdistan became a theater of the Iran–Iraq War. Although Iranian President Banisadr ordered a cease-fire with the Kurds following the Iraqi invasion, the IRGC ignored him, continuing their campaigns.[2]

The confrontation between Tehran and the Kurds intensified sharply when the Iran–Iraq War broke out, as Iran faced Iraqi support to the Kurdish insurgency in Iran while waging its own campaign to encourage the uprising of various groups within Iraq.[6] It was initially assumed that Iraqi and Iranian Kurds would cooperate to exploit weaknesses on both sides. Unsurprisingly, neither Baghdad nor Tehran was willing to accept that outcome. Rather, both sides insisted on organizing special loyalist Kurdish military units to participate in the war and to demonstrate allegiance to their respective states.[6]

Before June of 1980, the fighting had driven Ghassemlou's KDPI to request an official alliance with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which resulted in the signing of a seven-point agreement in Kirkuk. According to Ghassemlou, Iraq provided them with ammunition and anti-aircraft missiles, as they already had captured weapons from the Iranian army and did not need more of them.[27] Despite his alliance with Iraq, however, Ghassemlou pursued a policy of neutrality towards Iraqi Kurdish factions, such as the KDP and PUK, and aided negotiations between them and Baghdad.[28]

The policy of pursuing relations with Baghdad caused splits within the party, and in late May 1980, Ghani Bulurian and six others from the party's central committee renounced their party membership, alongside publishing Ghassemlou's private correspondences with the Iraqis, including information about a meeting between him and Iraqi vice president Taha Yasin Ramadan.[29]

Final stage

In January 1981, the Iraqi army successfully established a supply line to KDPI strongholds through Nowdesheh and Qasr-e Shirin, and began sending military equipment their way. This allowed the KDPI to cut off the Baghdad-Tehran highway, denying Iranian forces its use for some time. However, by late 1981, Iranian forces went on a counteroffensive and pushed Iraqi forces back over the border, debilitating the KDPI and rendering them a marginal military factor for the remainder of the war.[30] More than 10,000 Kurdish forces were allegedly killed during these battles.[31]

While the KDPI had been militarily defeated by the end of 1981, armed remnants of the group continued to shelter in northern Iraq.[32] Small groups of KDPI soldiers continued to engage in low-level campaigns against Iranian forces up until 1983, as more Iranian forces were diverted to the Iraqi front amid escalation of the Iran-Iraq war.[17] Komala militants also moved their military bases to Iraqi Kurdistan following Iranian operations on the border.[12]

Aftermath

While most of its military and political activity in Iran was greatly reduced after the 1979–1981 rebellion, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran had continued its opposition activities through the 1980s. In 1989, the KDPI renewed its military activities, among which most notable was the 1990 fighting, in which some 300 Iranian soldiers were allegedly killed.

Beginning in 1985, military conflict broke out between the KDPI and Komala inside northern Iraq, leading to hundreds of deaths among the two rebel groups.[32]

Since 1996, following an effective political and military crackdown, the conflict of KDPI against the Iranian government mainly shifted to political opposition abroad.

A renewed insurgency has taken place in Iranian Kurdistan since 2004 by another Kurdish militant organization— PJAK, affiliated with the Turkish PKK as part of the Kurdistan Communities Union.

Conflict parties

In media

Ettela'at newspaper publication

On 27 August 1979, in Sanandaj, Iran, 11 Kurdish prisoners were executed by a firing squad following a 30-minute trial under chief justice Sadegh Khalkhali.[33] Jahangir Razmi, a photographer for Iran's independent Ettela’at newspaper, captured the execution on film.[33]

Within hours an anonymous photo of the execution ran across 6 columns of the paper. On September 8, the newspaper was seized by the Foundation for the Disinherited, a state-owned holding company.[33] On April 14, 1980, the photo won a Pulitzer Prize. In 2006, Razmi made public 27 images from the execution that he had kept hidden.[33]

Che (2014 film)

In 2014, a film by the name of Che was produced detailing the experiences of Mostafa Chamran Save'ei during the battle for the city of Paveh, part of the 1979 conflict in Kurdistan province.[34] It won a number of awards, including two Crystal Simorghs in the fields of best editing and best visual effects.[35]

See also

References

  1. Denise, N. The Kurds And the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran:p.145 2005. Syracuse University Press. "Instead of creating a cohesive Kurdish nationalist movement, some Kurdish leaders such as Husayni's brother Shaykh Jalal accepted Iraqi military assistance and formed a Sunni militia opposed to the Iranian government and Kurdish nationalist parties. Qasimlu differentiated his real Kurdish nationalist party from traitors within the KDPI. Others, such as the prominent Ghani Bolourian, tried to negotiate with the central government. After the revolution, some Shi'a Kurds from Ilam, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan turned away from Kurdish nationalists and towards non-Kurdish Shi'a communities. Sunni Kurdish leftists continued to direct the nationalist project in their enclave in Kurdistan Province, having marginal influence over Shi'a Kurds in other regions." Archived 2013-09-26 at the Wayback Machine
  2. Ward, R.S. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces. 2009. pp.231–233. Archived 2016-05-05 at the Wayback Machine
  3. "Kurdistan - Iran". Archived from the original on 2017-12-10. Retrieved 2012-03-18.
  4. Zabir, Sepehr (2012). Iran Since the Revolution (RLE Iran D). Taylor & Francis. pp. 108–110. ISBN 978-1136833007.
  5. Muhammad Kamal (1986). "Iranian Left In Political Dilemma". Pakistan Horizon. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 39 (3): 39–51. JSTOR 41393782. Archived from the original on 2019-03-02. Retrieved 2017-12-14.
  6. Stokes, Jamie (2009). Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East: p.390. ISBN 9781438126760. Archived from the original on 2016-04-30. Retrieved 2015-06-20.
  7. "What Is Iran Doing in Syria?". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 2013-01-23. Retrieved 2012-09-23.
  8. Razoux, Pierre (2015). The Iran–Iraq War. Harvard University Press. Appendix E: Armed Opposition. ISBN 9780674915718.
  9. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2014-07-19. Retrieved 2012-10-21.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  10. Archived 2012-06-15 at the Wayback Machine "Sending in Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) rather than regular army troops, and dispatching the Ayatollah Sadiq Khalkhali—the "Hanging Judge"—resulted in the deaths of nearly 10,000 Kurds in the 1979–82 period alone, many in mass executions ordered by Khalkhali."
  11. Denise, N. The Kurds And the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran: p.144–45. 2005. Syracuse University Press. "Free to discuss its political views, the KDPI came out of thirty years of clandestine existence and made public claims for political autonomy"; "Despite its criticisms of the regime, in its early post-revolutionary public discourses the KDPI called itself an authentically national and Iranian party". Archived 2013-09-26 at the Wayback Machine
  12. "دموکرات کردستان ایران، حزب | مرکز دائرةالمعارف بزرگ اسلامی" [Democratic Kurdistan of Iran, Party]. www.cgie.org.ir. Retrieved 2022-04-27.
  13. "نتایج همه‌پرسی نظام جمهوری اسلامی" [Results of the Islamic Republic referendum] (PDF). Ministry of Interior (Iran).
  14. "Praguer Ghassemlou". Yekta Uzunoglu. Retrieved 4 July 2018.
  15. "Ali Reza Nourizadeh (Persian - Arabic - English)". Archived from the original on 2012-03-04. Retrieved 2012-03-18.
  16. "کردستان از فروردین‌ماه سال ۱۳۵۸ تا پاکسازی کامل" [Kurdistan from April 1979 to the complete cleansing]. defapress.ir. Retrieved 2022-04-27.
  17. "1979: Kurdish revolt grows in Iran". 1979-08-23. Archived from the original on 2021-01-16. Retrieved 2012-03-18.
  18. D. and in Khorasan [Cultural & Civil society of Khorasani Kurds, www.cskk.org]. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 1996, Chapter 13, "Subjects of the Shi'i Republic," pp. 261-287.
  19. de Kretser, Chris (August 19, 1979). "Khomeini, as Military Chief, Orders Kurdish Revolt Crushed". The Washington Post.
  20. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-06-02. Retrieved 2012-05-20.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  21. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-11-09. Retrieved 2012-05-20.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  22. Ayatollah Khomeini's Speech, Radio Tehran, December 17, 1979. Quoted in David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996, p. 271
  23. rev6 Archived November 6, 2010, at the Wayback Machine
  24. Valli, Abbas (2014-10-07). Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity. ISBN 9781780768236. Archived from the original on 2021-09-16. Retrieved 2020-11-07.
  25. "مروری بر برخی حوادث قبل از آغاز جنگ تحمیلی در غرب کشور (مردادماه 1359)" [An overview of some events before the start of the imposed war in the west of the country]. ISNA (in Persian). 2021-07-31. Retrieved 2022-04-18.
  26. Homan, Richard (1980-04-09). "Iran, Iraq on War Footing". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2022-04-18.
  27. "ارتباط عبدالرحمن ‎قاسملو و صدام" [Relationship between Abdul Rahman Qasemlu and Saddam]. Asr Islam. 9 May 2021. Retrieved 2022-04-18.
  28. "قاسملو؛ سرسپرده صدّام، علیه ایران، به گزارش ویکی‌لیکس" [Qassemlou; Saddam's plot against Iran, according to Wiki Leaks]. Azariha (in Persian). 2021-12-23. Retrieved 2022-04-18.
  29. McDowall, David (2021-03-25). A Modern History of the Kurds. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7556-0078-6.
  30. "The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 2022-04-18.
  31. "Are Kurds a pariah minority?|Social Research|Find Articles at BNET.com". Archived from the original on 2015-09-24. Retrieved 2012-03-18.
  32. Rudolph Jr., Joseph R. (2015-12-07). Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, 2nd Edition [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-61069-553-4.
  33. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2016-03-06. Retrieved 2012-05-17.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  34. "Soft War: The 2014 Fajr International Film Festival | Iran Media Program". web.archive.org. 2016-03-04. Retrieved 2022-04-27.
  35. ""Hussein, Who Said No", "Che" scoop up awards at Fajr Film Festival". www.payvand.com. Retrieved 2022-04-27.

Further reading

  • Alemzadeh, Maryam (2021). "The attraction of direct action: the making of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iranian Kurdish conflict". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: 1–20. doi:10.1080/13530194.2021.1990013. S2CID 239554621.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.